1 APPEARANCES 2 On behalf of Plaintiffs Elizabeth Sines, Seth 3 Wispelwey, Marissa Blair, Tyler Magill, April Muniz, Hannah 4 Pearce, Marcus Martin, John Doe, Natalie Romero, and Chelsea 5 Alvarado: 6 JOSHUA MICHAEL SIEGEL, ESQUIRE Cooley LLP 7 1299 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Suite 700 Washington, DC 20004 8 202-842-7800 jsiegel@cooley.com 9 MICHAEL LOW BLOCH, ESQUIRE 10 Kaplan Hecker & Fink LLP 350 Fifth Avenue, Suite 7110 11 New York, NY 10118 12 212-763-0883 mbloch@kaplanhecker.com 13 On behalf of James Fields: 14 DENISE Y. LUNSFORD, ESQUIRE 15 Denise Y. Lunsford, LLC 16 414 E. Market Street, Suite C Charlottesville, Virginia 22902 17 434-328-8798 JOHN IRVING HILL, ESQUIRE 18 PoindexterHill, P.C. 19 404 S. Wayne Ave. P.O. Box 1067 20 Waynesboro, VA 22980 540-943-1118 21 22 Also Present: 23 JONATHAN KENNETH ZWERLING, ESQUIRE 24

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(Proceedings commenced, 1:14 p.m.)

(Prior proceedings held, not recorded; hearing continued as follows:)

MS. LUNSFORD: ...would add that in one of the documents that I filed, there was an agreed motion and order for discovery entered by Judge Downer in the Charlottesville General District Court. I had wanted to file that, Judge, with the motion to reconsider, but I didn't have a copy of it as entered by the judge and had to obtain that from the court. It is under seal, as the Court can see, and so it was not available online; and I had some difficulty obtaining it, the signed copy of it.

It does provide on -- in paragraph number five, on the first page, that we agree not to allow additional materials provided by the Commonwealth to leave our possession or control.

And on the second page, where the judge has signed it, it indicates that the judge is ordering that the discovery in this case be handled in the manner described in the agreed motion and order regarding discovery.

So we're actually prohibited by this order -- which has never been amended, has never been withdrawn, has never been addressed by the Circuit Court -- prohibited from providing that material; so anything that came from the Commonwealth.

And we would request that the discovery that we received from the Commonwealth be treated the same as the federal material that we received from the U.S. Attorney's Office because of this order, and also suggest that another source of that material, which is more convenient, less burdensome, and less expensive, as set forth in Rule 26, is the Commonwealth Attorney himself. They have access to the material and they don't have to cull it for privileged information or work-product, as we would have to do, which would take an extensive amount of time.

Moving on, Your Honor -- I'm sorry. Go ahead.

THE COURT: Well, I think that argument that they should get it from the Commonwealth Attorney, I don't know that I've seen that argument before in either your motion that was filed back in February or even your motion to reconsider.

But what materials do you think are covered by this General District Court order?

MS. LUNSFORD: So what the order provides is, under state Rule 3A:11 and 7C:5, that were in existence at that time -- I think the rules change in July -- is that correct? -- but they haven't changed yet. Basically what we are entitled to under those rules is exculpatory evidence, basically Brady and Giglio, if any such evidence exists; statements of our clients. Statements of witnesses we're not

entitled to. We're not entitled to police reports. We're entitled to certificates of analysis. So there were some DNA certificates in this case; we are entitled to that.

The bulk of information that is provided by the Commonwealth around here, pursuant to open files, to include witness statements, police reports, videos of the scene, anything — any photographs taken of the car, information that is not specifically exculpatory, or the statement of my client to law enforcement, not a statement made to someone else, but to law enforcement, anything else they're not required to provide to us, and so that would be protected under this order. Basically, it's anything that we couldn't get pursuant to Rule 3A:11 or 7C:5, we are not allowed to leave our possession.

The Commonwealth -- and the order -- or, I'm sorry, the open file agreement that the Court has previously seen, which the Commonwealth waived privilege on, is attached to this order. One of the documents I filed this afternoon was an e-mail exchange between Mr. Platania as Commonwealth Attorney and Mr. Zwerling, and he agreed that it does not nullify the court's -- (inaudible).

THE COURT: Ms. Lunsford, you're -- Ms. Lunsford, I can't hear you. You're breaking up.

MS. LUNSFORD: (Inaudible).

THE COURT: I still can't. I still can't hear you.

1 Can the deputy clerk hear? Is that my phone or is it --2 3 THE CLERK: Your Honor, this is Karen, and she's 4 staticy on my end as well. 5 THE COURT: Okay. 6 MS. LUNSFORD: Is this better? I picked up the 7 handset. THE COURT: No, it's still pretty -- still pretty 8 9 staticy. 10 MS. LUNSFORD: I apologize, Judge. I don't hear any 11 static on my end at this point. 12 THE COURT: Okay. I can hear you now. 13 MS. LUNSFORD: Okay. The e-mail exchange between 14 Mr. Zwerling and Mr. Platania indicates that obviously the 15 Commonwealth cannot agree away the Court's order that was 16 entered in late October of 2017. 17 THE COURT: A number of questions. The order refers 18 to "this case." What is your view of "this case"? I mean, 19 this is a General District Court order. Does it just apply 20 to the General District Court preliminary hearing and so 21 forth in that case, or is it your contention that this order 22 governs discovery in the Circuit Court as well? 23 MS. LUNSFORD: It's my contention that the term 24 "this case" and, as a result, "this order," pertains to that 25 case until it is concluded at some point in the future.

And to let the Court know, I am still counsel for Mr. Fields. I've done a notice of appeal, and our petition for appeal to the Court of Appeals of Virginia is not yet due but I expect will be due before the end of the summer.

And traditionally around here, in the City of Charlottesville and Albemarle County, orders of the General District Court follow through the Circuit Court unless and until amended or vacated by the Circuit Court; and that would include things like appointment of counsel.

There was never a new appointment of counsel in Circuit Court for either Mr. Hill or me. We never moved to withdraw. And so because of the General District Court's orders appointing us, we continued.

The same applies for experts that were appointed in the General District Court and who followed the case through the end. There were new orders for payment of one of those experts, but never a new order appointing the expert.

THE COURT: All right. And so any subsequent orders -- your view is any subsequent orders by the Circuit Court that might have addressed, might have addressed discovery -- were there any, or your contention is there weren't any?

MS. LUNSFORD: I have -- my recollection is there were not. My recollection is not the best at this point.

And there were so many orders and going back and forth that I

did a search of my computer records, my pleadings file, and then also asked the clerk to see if they were aware of anything else, and couldn't find anything else. So I do not believe there's an additional order with regard to discovery.

And I will tell the Court -- I mean, the Court addressed the order pertaining to exhibits from Judge Moore in the Charlottesville Circuit Court, and I understand the Court's ruling and obviously accept that, but I will say that the judge never intended that the attorneys in this case release exhibits, either. And I think the spirit, if not, I would argue, the letter of that order, indicates that the exhibits were not to be released by anyone, but the --

THE COURT: Well, then the order is, but not that if you were given an exhibit from the Court that you could then release; it was -- I think it was clear, in my opinion, that if these were materials that you had and other -- that you had from a source other than receiving them from the Court as an exhibit, that they weren't covered by that, that order.

MS. LUNSFORD: I understand that that's the Court's reading of the order. And I don't mean any disrespect when I say that, having been in front of Judge Moore on motions and hearings with regard to this case for over a year and a half, almost two years, that he would not have hesitated to hold me in contempt had I released an exhibit that was presented at the trial even if I said, "But, Judge, I got it from another

source."

The Commonwealth is the one that released those exhibits, and the Court ordered that we provide them if we got them from another source. So obviously, you know, there's a bit of a conflict, but I'll take that up with Judge Moore.

But anyway, having said that --

THE COURT: Ms. Lunsford, so if this was -- if this order from the General District Court that was entered three years ago, this was always governing your conduct in handling discovery in this case, and you filed a motion to quash in February, over four months ago, why is this just being filed? I mean, it was filed 21 minutes before this hearing.

MS. LUNSFORD: I appreciate the Court's question, and I apologize. The only explanation -- and it's not an excuse -- that I can offer is, as I indicated, I thought there was an order, I had looked through my file, I expected that if there was an order pertaining to discovery, it would be in my pleadings file. It was not in my pleadings file. I found it when I was -- or I didn't find it, the endorsed order. I found a draft of the order in an e-mail from Nina Anthony, who is an Assistant Commonwealth Attorney for the City of Charlottesville and worked on this case. I found it in an e-mail attachment while I was preparing the motion to reconsider, and then started trying to find out if it had, in

fact, been entered.

Mr. Hill and I, and, frankly, the Commonwealth, treated all the documents, unless we entered them as exhibits at trial or submitted them in our case to experts or had the experts review them, treated them consistent with the terms of this order.

We had law students who acted as interns on this case, who the Court required to sign confidentiality agreements with regard not only to the documents but anything they touched with respect to this case.

So, you know, we were highly sensitive during the course of the trial, and even until today, about what we released in this case.

I did not have a copy of the order, and that's the only explanation that I can give to this Court with respect to why I didn't attach it originally.

By the same token, you know, thinking about Mr. Platania, he had obviously forgotten about it, too, or I don't think that he would have waived the provisions of the open file agreement, which is attached to this order.

THE COURT: Did you receive -- every bit of discovery received from the Commonwealth in your representation of Mr. Fields, did you receive it while the case was in General District Court, or did you receive some after it moved to Circuit Court? And do you think that makes

a difference? I mean, do you think that, regardless of the timing of the disclosure, that it's all covered by the General District Court order?

MS. LUNSFORD: To answer your second question, yes, I think, regardless of the timing, it's covered by the order. And this may be, you know, a matter of practice around here and a matter of understanding, but our view, as I said, even with respect to appointments and other orders, is that they followed to Circuit Court unless they were amended or modified in some way.

everything from the Commonwealth prior to the time that it left General District Court, we did not. We received information from the Commonwealth, pursuant to their open file and discovery policies, you know, I would guess as late as -- trial was in November 2018. You know, I -- I don't know exactly when we received stuff, but I wouldn't be surprised to go back and discover that we received stuff in November of 2018. It was constant.

THE COURT: All right. I want to wrap up the issue of the General District Court's order here, everything you have to say on that, and if Mr. Hill has anything else to add, and then I'd like to hear from plaintiffs on that issue before we move on to anything else.

MS. LUNSFORD: Other than that it is more

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convenient, less burdensome, and less expensive for the
plaintiffs to receive it from the Commonwealth. And they
were -- they did discuss it with the Commonwealth. I'm not
sure why the Commonwealth elected not to provide it and,
rather, directed that it be received from us. The
Commonwealth, as I said, does not have the issue of privilege
with respect to Mr. Fields that would require us to go
through and create the privilege log. They can produce
everything as they see fit. But, frankly, I think they are
still bound by the terms of this order as well.
         THE COURT: All right.
         MS. LUNSFORD: Actually, they are not. I'm sorry.
Paragraph five talks about counsel for the defendant.
         MR. ZWERLING: Judge, this is John Zwerling. Could
I add one thing to this?
         THE COURT: Well, Mr. Zwerling, you haven't -- are
you -- have you made an appearance in the case?
         MR. ZWERLING:
                       Well, Ms. Lunsford is not a party.
         THE COURT: Well, she's a movant.
         MR. ZWERLING: Let me speak to her and see if she
wants to say it. Okay?
                           I can hear somebody else's
         THE COURT: Okay.
conversation in the background. So if everybody else can put
their phones on mute, perhaps.
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MS. LUNSFORD: Your Honor, I would just say, in

addition to what I've already argued, the Commonwealth must have contemplated that we continued to be bound by this agreement, because they did continue to provide us discovery throughout the course of this, this case, up through and including at least through trial, if not through sentencing. And it was actually -- as I said, I received this order, the draft of the order, from the Commonwealth. It was -- it was not a document that I created. It was something that they had created and used in other cases and they were adamant that we abide by. And as the Court can see in number five, it applies to the defendant, counsel for the defendant. It doesn't apply to the Commonwealth.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Hill, is there anything that you wanted to add to that argument?

MR. HILL: No, Judge.

I will, however, say one thing about our -- I guess our memory of that order and its existence, in that about two weeks ago I supplied two documents to Mr. Siegel in response to the subpoena that clearly, now that we look at it, were in violation of that order. And so, you know, when we discussed -- when Denise and I discussed, you know, what we could send to Mr. Siegel in an attempt to comply with the Court order, we talked about items we received directly from the Commonwealth, and only from the Commonwealth. We sent two items that belonged in that category. But now, in

retrospect, in looking at this order, it seems that those items that we provided were probably protected by the General District Court order.

So I'm sorry that I didn't remember it. I know that Denise is accurate in that there were a lot of orders entered in this case, and I apologize that we didn't find it sooner.

THE COURT: All right. All right.

Well, Mr. Siegel or Mr. Bloch, I know that neither — the time to respond to the motion to reconsider or the motion to stay hasn't been passed, and y'all may not have even had a chance to read what was just filed shortly before the hearing, so I certainly want to make sure that y'all have time to address these issues. And not just here today, but if you need time to research them and consider them more fully or to confer with the movants or the Commonwealth, you know, I'm not trying to short-circuit that. I do think that it was important to try and — try and do this hearing on the motion to reconsider, as it was written, and to address the issues raised in the motion, to do that quickly so this case could continue to move, move forward, on this issue.

But what do either one of y'all have to say about the arguments presented today?

MR. SIEGEL: Your Honor, this is Joshua Siegel. And thank you. I do have some thoughts and I think some things that are important to keep in mind.

I think it's important to view the requested relief and the scope of the legal standard that applies to the motion. So we're here on a motion to reconsider. And the law is very clear that those motions are strongly disfavored. They are to not be used as a vehicle to relitigate issues, give parties a chance to craft new or better arguments, to present facts that were previously available or already existed, or allow them a second bite at the apple. The law is very clear in this court and the Fourth Circuit on that.

And as it relates to the timing, the timeline of events that got us here today is, Ms. Hill -- I'm sorry,
Mr. Hill and Ms. Lunsford have a client that is a party in this case and in, I think, three years of litigation, have produced zero documents to us. We've issued a subpoena to Mr. Hill and Ms. Lunsford in January. They filed their motion to quash in February. We then briefed it and we filed our opposition in March. They chose not to file a reply. We filed a supplemental brief in May, advising the Court of precisely this issue: that the Commonwealth Attorney had agreed to waive the open file agreement. Mr. Hill and Ms. Lunsford chose not to respond.

On June 12, the Court issued the order, in large part denying the motions to quash.

On June 18, they filed a motion to reconsider.

This order is two and a half years old. Just

looking at it -- like you said, Your Honor, it was filed a few minutes before the hearing. I'm looking at it while we're talking. This order was not raised in the motion to quash. It wasn't raised in the motion to reconsider. I spoke with Mr. Hill on the phone a week ago about the document production. He didn't raise this order. I spoke with Mr. Hill on the phone just this week about this teleconference; he didn't raise it. Mr. Hill sent me a letter yesterday about his document production and didn't raise it.

Now they file it 20 minutes before the hearing.

There's no reason this couldn't have been raised in January or in February, when Mr. Hill and Ms. Lunsford filed their motions to quash.

And I think Ms. Lunsford said that she thought it existed, she just couldn't find it. To me, that does not meet the standard of the disfavored and only-granted-sparingly remedy of a motion to reconsider.

As it relates to the order -- again, I'm just looking at it right now, Your Honor, so apologies if this is going to be incomplete, but I think a couple things to note. I think the Court was exactly right when you said this is a General District Court order. I think it's a fundamental principle that one cannot control the treatment of evidence in a different court. Again, that issue is being raised for

the first time right now, so we haven't had a chance to address that.

Even if the order did apply, it appears -- again just reading what it says in paragraph five, it simply memorializes the open file agreement that the Commonwealth Attorney has already waived; and he waived that months ago.

On top of that, on its face, it doesn't apply to documents that are in the scope of Rule 3A:11(b) or Rule 7C:5. And I think Ms. Lunsford spoke a bit about that.

And we addressed this also in our opposition to the motion to quash, laying out the categories of documents. For example, written statements from Mr. Fields, any confessions he made, written reports of autopsies, expert reports, fingerprint analyses, all those things are acknowledged in the scope of this order. So there is a large volume of material that, even if this order did apply, are encumbered by it.

And on top of that, they said a few minutes ago that those rules don't apply to the police reports. They've already provided us with police reports.

So, Your Honor, I don't think that this order should be used as an eleventh hour -- frankly, we're well past the eleventh hour now. It shouldn't be used in regards to these documents, that we could have dealt with this order in January, but we are three weeks from the deposition deadline.

We're a few weeks away from the end of third-party discovery after years of discovery. And I know Your Honor is very familiar with the difficulties we've had getting discovery from virtually any of the defendants and now, you know, virtually any of these third parties.

And so our view is that the Court should not consider this, the newly filed order. However, I will say that if the Court is inclined, it seems to me that there's a simple solution if the Court does decide that this order applies in that this order appears to be an agreed order between Ms. Hill -- I'm sorry, Ms. Lunsford and the Commonwealth's Attorney's Office.

agreed to waive the open file agreement. Ms. Lunsford is already under an order from this Court to produce those documents. They asked for a very short extension of ten days in the motion to stay. And if Your Honor wants to give any weight to this order at all, I think, at most, it would be they have a ten-day extension and in that time it is incumbent on Ms. Lunsford to submit an agreed order modifying this order, an agreed order, because the Commonwealth Attorney has already agreed to it. She already has a court order. She hasn't produced these documents. And, frankly, at this point, Your Honor, I think the burden is on them. We believe we could have dealt this issue six or seven months

ago, and it is being raised for the very first time minutes before this hearing.

acknowledges, this order is really for the -- it's drafted by the Commonwealth. It's -- sounds like it's for the Commonwealth's benefit. It's not -- you know, something that Ms. Lunsford notes Mr. Fields agreed to, but it wasn't necessarily what he would have done from his choosing. It's really at the Commonwealth's instigation, and now the Commonwealth hasn't waived those protections, but it's not just an agreement between the parties. It's essentially a protective order of another court regarding those documents.

MS. LUNSFORD: Could I speak to that briefly, Your Honor?

THE COURT: Sure.

MS. LUNSFORD: I mean, the order on its face talks about the agreement extending to Mr. Fields, who we could not provide copies of materials that we got from the Commonwealth even to our client, and it was not — in paragraph seven, we had to agree that it would not be made part of his file, so that if we were relieved as counsel in some manner, we could not transmit it to new counsel. And while that's incredibly unusual, it was something that the Commonwealth asked for in order to provide us with discovery, and so we were willing to enter into it to get the discovery, number one; but secondly,

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Charlottesville is where this trial was going to take place, ultimately did take place. It's a very small community. Defense was concerned that information from the file, the Commonwealth's open file, if that got out in any way prior to trial and we did not get a change of venue, which we did not, we would be extremely hampered, even more than we already were, in picking a jury. So while it was provided to us by the Commonwealth, and ordered us to make disclosure, it was something that we wanted both to get the additional discovery and also to sort of use as a shield in the event other people, our client, experts, people that we didn't feel needed access to information, and this notwithstanding, but that we -- so that we could get the information in a manner that made the Commonwealth comfortable, but also that we would not be required to produce any information, we could require confidentiality agreements from people that don't ordinarily sign such things, and have access to all that information. Otherwise --MR. SIEGEL: Your Honor --MS. LUNSFORD: Go ahead. Sorry, Josh. MR. SIEGEL: Your Honor, this is Mr. Siegel, if I could respond to that. THE COURT: Sure.

MR. SIEGEL: So, again, Your Honor, we're just

rehashing old ground here. These are more, frankly, roadblocks that is not entitling us to discovery here, because what I just heard is it was important that the Commonwealth's Attorney -- it is important to the Commonwealth's Attorney that Ms. Lunsford and Mr. Hill don't give this to Mr. Fields.

We're not asking that it be given to Mr. Fields. That's a nonissue here.

I also heard Ms. Lunsford say that, well, the Commonwealth's Attorney wanted to be very careful about what happened to this, what happened to this evidence.

The Commonwealth's Attorney has already agreed they can disclose it. These are not reasons not to produce it.

These are artificial reasons to keep it away and got give us these documents that we've been trying to get for years from both their client, and then we've been litigating this for six, almost seven, months on this one issue and we still don't have documents.

Even the documents we do have -- I think they produced two documents to us out of the categories that they admit in their briefs are on their face not privileged. They say they have a whole bunch of e-mails from third parties, that were unsolicited e-mails from third parties about Fields, about the car attack, about the rally. We don't have any of those. They say they got records about Mr. Fields

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from the military service. We don't have those. The stuff
that they say they will give us, they're not giving us, and
the stuff that they don't want to give us, they're inventing
these new arguments that have already been litigated.
Commonwealth Attorney has already agreed none of the
arguments make any difference and nothing changes the order,
even if it was raised in the first instance on the motion to
quash, which it wasn't.
         MR. HILL: Can I ask a question of Mr. Siegel,
Judge?
         THE COURT: Who is that?
         MR. HILL: Why haven't you received these documents
from the Commonwealth Attorney?
         THE COURT: Who's speaking? Is this Mr. Hill?
         MR. HILL:
                   Yeah.
         THE COURT: Yeah, for the -- because this is being
recorded, I do need you to --
         MR. HILL:
                  I'm sorry.
                               Yes.
         THE COURT: I do need you to identify yourself.
         MR. HILL: This is Mr. Hill. I'm just curious --
         THE COURT: Mr. Hill, hold on. I think that's a
good question, but rather than you posing it, how about if I
ask it?
         Mr. Siegel, are there other ways that the plaintiff
has explored to try and obtain this information so that it
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would be less burdensome on Ms. Lunsford and Mr. Hill?

MR. SIEGEL: I'm happy to address that, Your Honor.

First, on the issue of burden, again, burden has never been raised until the motion to reconsider. They certainly could have argued burden in a motion to quash, and they didn't.

As far as quantifying the burden, they never tell you anywhere in their papers any sort of definition about why -- what sort of burden this imposes. They say they have a hard drive and three thumb drives that contain discovery from the Commonwealth. There's no burden to produce that because it doesn't have to be reviewed. It's responsive and cannot be privileged because they received it from the Commonwealth. That is no burden.

They say they have two other thumb drives they're trying to figure out where they received it. They say they have third-party -- unsolicited e-mails from third parties. Those are not privileged. And they said that they relate to the rally and the car attack; so they're responsive.

So they have yet to articulate any specific burdens here, to begin with, other than just saying: it's burdensome. That's not any -- that's not a description of burden that contains any specificity and does not meet the standard to raise an objection.

THE COURT: You're not seeking any -- and you're clear in the subpoena you're not seeking anything that's work-product, you're not seeking anything that is attorney-client communications. Really anything that Ms. Lunsford or Mr. Hill would have created in their defense, you're not seeking that?

MR. SIEGEL: That's correct, Your Honor. We've said that multiple times. And despite us saying that, they keep responding -- they keep kind of ignoring the fact that we're limiting it and still saying it's burdensome.

A great example is in the motion to reconsider, I think they have a whole page about jury information. We said in our opposition to the motion to quash we're not seeking information about jurors.

You wrote in your opinion, we're not seeking information about jurors. There again, throwing it out there as another reason not to produce these documents.

But you're exactly right. We're not seeking attorney-client privileged information. We're not seeking work-product information. Most of the stuff -- when they describe it in their brief, most of the stuff is, by definition, not privileged and not work-product and doesn't even need to be reviewed.

And on that note, I know there are multiple decisions from this Court -- and I can cite some of them if

you'd like, Your Honor -- that talk about the situation where a party says -- makes the argument that it can be very burdensome to review all these documents and identify which ones are privileged and which ones are not. And this Court has repeatedly said, that's not really a valid excuse because most of the time, and certainly in this case, there's a protective order with a claw back.

So when you're producing a giant tranche, for example, of third-party e-mails, that are these unsolicited third-party e-mails, or a hard drive that you got from the Commonwealth, and if for some reason there happens to be a privileged document in there, we're not allowed to use it, we're not allowed to read it, we have to destroy it, we can't give it to anybody. These are standard provisions. This is the same standard the plaintiffs and defendants are under, the same protective order that exists in this case.

So, again, there's no -- there's no burden here and they have not articulated a burden. I think the most specific they got was that there are four boxes of documents, other than the electronic documents, which again I said can largely be produced without review.

On the issue of getting these documents from another source other than the Commonwealth's Attorney, we've gotten some documents from them, but there's two kind of fundamental issues that don't allow us -- won't allow us to get the

documents we're seeking from Mr. Hill and Ms. Lunsford. One is some of the documents Ms. Lunsford and Mr. Hill have, the Commonwealth's Attorney does not have.

For example, they told you in the motion to reconsider they have all these e-mails from third parties about the attack, about Fields. The Commonwealth Attorney doesn't have those.

I think it's not unreasonable to assume that some documents they got independently of the Commonwealth's Attorney. For example, they talk about their client's armed services records. I don't know if they got those from the Commonwealth's Attorney or not, but if they got it as part of their investigation, which I'm sure they undertook some investigation in the representation of their client on a murder case, to the extent they didn't create them and those are pre-existing records, or whatever materials they obtained, those are not privileged, those are not work-product. They can be produced. The Commonwealth's Attorney doesn't have them.

They also have things -- they called during their case a crash reconstruction expert. They have his report.

They didn't get that -- I don't believe they got that from the Commonwealth's Attorney.

Other evidence they may have collected -- his social media accounts, as Your Honor knows, that's a very big deal

in this case. Mr. Fields has refused to produce any. Again, not privileged, no need to review.

As far as documents that they received from the Commonwealth's Attorney, as Ms. Lunsford explained to you, it was kind of -- and as I understand it from the Commonwealth's Attorney, the way Ms. Lunsford and Mr. Hill obtained documents was on a rolling basis, and they were allowed to go in and inspect the file and copy specific documents. So the Commonwealth's Attorney doesn't have a record of -- I don't think they can tell exactly what was given to Ms. Lunsford and Mr. Hill. And as a result of that, they would have -- the Commonwealth's Attorney can't just say, Oh, here's a hard drive that we exchanged with the other side, so we know it's not privileged, it doesn't have to be reviewed, because they don't know what Ms. Lunsford and Mr. Hill have.

Ms. Lunsford and Mr. Hill can do that. They do have a hard drive and three thumb drives that they got from the Commonwealth's Attorney. It doesn't have to be reviewed. The Commonwealth Attorney would have to do that. It's not as easy for the Commonwealth's Attorney to produce as it would be for Mr. Hill and Ms. Lunsford, because the Commonwealth's Attorney does generate work-product.

THE COURT: And really all that is is just seeking discovery from another third party. I don't know, the federal rules would say -- well, it's one thing to say you

have to -- you have to try and obtain this information from the party rather -- rather than a third party, but I don't know of any decision saying, rather than trying to obtain documents from one third party, where that could be burdensome, you really have to go and try and get them from another third party.

MR. SIEGEL: And that was actually my next point, Your Honor, because what happens --

MS. LUNSFORD: Your Honor, I --

MR. SIEGEL: -- is when you go to one third party, they point the finger at another third party. Then you go to that third party, then we're having another hearing and that third party is pointing to another third party.

And it's not my obligation to obtain evidence from who Ms. Lunsford and Mr. Hill think I should obtain it from. We issued them valid subpoenas. Those subpoenas are the subject of multiple briefs at this point. They filed their motion to quash. They had their bite at the apple. The Court ruled on it.

This is not an extraordinary request, Your Honor.

This is basic discovery. We're not asking the Court to waive privilege. We're not asking the Court to give us work-product because we have substantial need. We're asking for basic documents that they obtained from third parties or that are — that relate to their client, that are critical

evidence in this case, critical evidence in the criminal case that they've already had. This is not an extraordinary request. This is basic document discovery. Because for three years we've been denied that from Mr. Fields.

MS. LUNSFORD: Your Honor, if I can speak to this, I think Mr. Siegel -- I understand Mr. Siegel's points, and I understand the Court's familiarity with the civil litigation, which neither Mr. Hill nor I are. Mr. Hill and I are not civil attorneys. We don't practice civil cases in federal court. We're not parties to the proceeding. Mr. Fields has an attorney who represents him in this.

These -- the subpoenas came in late January, so not knowing civil procedure, not having -- we were appointed in the underlying case. I am a sole practitioner. I have no support staff currently; it's just me in the office.

Mr. Hill has two attorneys in his practice, one of which I think is part-time, and a very small support staff. We do not have substantial funds and are trying to -- in addition to responding to this discovery and protect our client's interests, the person who is still our client, we're also trying to make a living. So I just want to put that out there, because I think it's important when the Court is considering undue burden.

We were not aware and were not noticed, as we put in the motion to reconsider, that there would be any

consideration of our motion to quash in the hearing heard in April, a time at which our courts were closed and our offices were severely --

THE COURT: Ms. Lunsford, let me cut you off there.

That hearing, it was just a status conference, and what

happened at that hearing -- you may know this, you may not -
was that I just asked if any of the motions had been

resolved. Some of them had; some of them hadn't. And then I

asked if anybody wanted a hearing. There wasn't any

substantive discussion of the motions.

And, you know, the Court's local rules, the scheduling order, it puts the burden on the parties -- or a movant in your case -- to request a hearing. It's not the Court's job to track down anyone who files something in the case to find out if they want a hearing. I took that extra step because I was trying to give everybody the maximum opportunity to weigh in on these motions.

MS. LUNSFORD: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: There was an opposition filed to your motion, and under the rules you have an opportunity to reply.

Y'all didn't reply. You know --

MS. LUNSFORD: I agree and I apologize.

THE COURT: -- we really expect everybody, even pro se litigants, to familiarize himself or herself with the rules of the court and the federal civil or criminal

procedural rules. So, you know, I just -- I don't think that any of those arguments provide any reason for me to reconsider.

Now, I --

MS. LUNSFORD: Well --

THE COURT: But at the same time, but the one thing that you did say -- and let me just amend what I just said a little bit. One thing that you did say that I do think warrants some consideration is that if this -- is that the rules, Rule 45(d)(2)(B)(ii), allows for basically shifting of costs to produce the records.

And from Mr. Siegel's viewpoint, the four banker's boxes that you referred to, that's not going to require a real thorough privileged review for a number of reasons; one, given they're not asking for any sort of documents that could be privileged, they're just asking for what y'all received from the Commonwealth; and then, you know, third-party e-mails, things like that. Now, maybe that requires a bit of a review, but you certainly could ask for your copying costs for those documents. If it does require some review, you certainly can ask for fees on that.

Now, I'm not sure what the plaintiffs' position is on it, but that's -- you know, that's something that I think it's an argument you could have made earlier, but it's something that I am sensitive to as well.

MS. LUNSFORD: Could I -- I don't want to cut the Court off, but I do think it's important for the Court to understand the volume of documents that we have, what we have and what Mr. Siegel thinks we have, but we don't actually have, because I think what is going to happen in terms of what we can resolve today versus what we're going to have to resolve at some point in the future is privileged information, work-product information, and other sealed documents.

And I will tell you, if the -- I will say that we have e-mails from third parties, unsolicited e-mails from third parties. I'll tell the Court that in preparation for this -- and I apologize I didn't put it in the motion. I was trying to pay attention to my other court obligations and my other clients, while also filing a motion to reconsider within a certain period of time, and I was not familiar with the federal rules of court. I've tried to become more familiar with them with respect to civil procedure. And that's why we didn't do it earlier.

But back to e-mails, I'm not computer literate, but I did figure out how to find out how much information I have on e-mails related solely to Mr. Fields. And my e-mails related to him, which I kept in a separate folder, are 537 megabytes of information.

Now, I'll tell the Court that means absolutely

nothing to me, but I did do some internet research and according to -- I think LexisNexis is one of the sites that talks about how much -- how many e-mails, for example, can be stored on 537 megabytes of whatever. It would consist, according to this site, of about 5500 e-mails and 1600 attachments.

Those are not all from third parties that were unsolicited. Some of them are -- and it will require me to go through however much 537 megabytes of information is to isolate those and provide those as opposed to the e-mails between me and Mr. Hill, between me and the Commonwealth, between Mr. Hill and I and mental health experts, for example. So that's just with respect to e-mails.

I do have four boxes, one of which is jury questionnaires, which I understand the plaintiffs aren't seeking but are responsive; and as I read Rule 45, I would have to create a log indicating what I'm not providing but I do have that is responsive. So I have three --

THE COURT: Well, we can -- if I haven't already amended the -- the subpoena, it can be -- it can be amended so that that information is excluded. And plaintiffs have said on the record they don't want --

MS. LUNSFORD: I understand that.

THE COURT: So, I mean, that's not something you would need to put in.

Also, if privilege is really, you know, a concern, sometimes you can do categories rather than each individual document.

MS. LUNSFORD: We can try to do that. I will tell the Court that the bulk of the information that is in those three boxes -- at least one of them is trial materials. And when I say "trial materials," those are my handwritten notes. There are witness outlines. There are things of that nature. But there are at least two other boxes of information that I would need to go through. And I suspect much of that is privileged.

And at some point we're probably going to have to be before the Court on what is privileged, what is work-product, and what I am saying is privileged versus what Mr. Siegel thinks of as privileged, on things like Army records.

And Mr. Hill sent a letter to Mr. Siegel asking:
You know, these are the kinds of documents that we have, what
do you want?

And one of the kinds of documents that I have is what I refer to as historical information about our client. These are records that would not -- records that our client had to sign a release for us to get. They are largely protected by privilege. The bulk of them, I will say, I expect were created before January 1, 2015. But I need to go through all of them -- and they're not -- it's not a small

amount of paper records -- to see what is before January 2015 and what's after.

I would argue even the stuff that's after January 1, 2015 that are school records -- which might be very small after that date -- medical records, mental health records, Army records, are certainly work-product, because they were obtained by me during the course of this litigation for this criminal case for purposes of providing to or use by --

THE COURT: Did you create the documents?

MS. LUNSFORD: I didn't create them. I requested them from third parties. They're protected by --

THE COURT: Well, I don't see how they would be work-product. And there is a protective order in this case that I think would protect the medical records.

MS. LUNSFORD: They're protected by HIPAA, and I would argue that they're also privileged.

And I discussed with Mr. Zwerling, who, again, is acting as a volunteer, but has also done some research on work-product, and I think there's an argument that they are work-product.

With respect to pleadings, Mr. Siegel --

THE COURT: Well, but, Ms. Lunsford, I mean, why on earth are you asserting that now? You know, your motion was filed in February, and I -- I have to agree with Mr. Siegel that almost all this is entirely inappropriate to be raising

it in a motion to reconsider and then now, in this hearing, because just about every argument that you're asserting you knew of at the time, or at least you should have known of at the time, and it is not newly discovered. You know, it really is a quintessential second bite at the apple.

Now, I'm sympathetic to some things, you know, like the costs it would put on you, but the rest of it is -- you know, you're --

MS. LUNSFORD: Well, that's why I stated to the Court that I felt like we needed to talk about it now, because I would argue that most of this is either privileged or work-product, if it's not covered by HIPAA, or outside the time.

THE COURT: Well, I mean, is the -- are you talking about the information that you received from the Commonwealth as well? Do you think that's privileged?

MS. LUNSFORD: I don't think it's privileged. The problem with the information that was obtained from the Commonwealth -- and I do think the Court needs to weigh in on this, because Mr. Siegel has indicated that if it came -- if the United States Attorney provided a document, for example, to the Commonwealth, and the Commonwealth then provided that document to us, we should turn it over because we got it from the Commonwealth.

I don't care if it's discovery when I turn it over

or not if it came from the Commonwealth or the U.S. Attorney, but there are some documents that the U.S. Attorney gave to the Commonwealth that the Commonwealth then gave to us. And I don't know if the Court considers that discovery from the Commonwealth or something that we're prohibited from providing under --

THE COURT: I think it's from -- if you got it from the Commonwealth, then I think it came to you from the Commonwealth. It's not -- you know, it's not -- unless there's some -- something that would tie that to a federal court's order limiting dissemination, then it didn't come from the U.S. Attorney's Office to you, it came from the Commonwealth.

MS. LUNSFORD: The U.S. Attorney's Office takes a different view, but obviously that falls in their court.

In terms of, you know, Mr. Siegel's assertion that the Commonwealth doesn't know what it gave us, that we were allowed to copy documents, we were not. We were provided with discs. And the subpoena seeks original documents, but I'm still representing Mr. Fields on the appeal, and I cannot simply turn over the discs. I can -- once I determine what source they came from, I can perhaps clone them at the expense of the plaintiff.

We did not request information from social media accounts. We -- whatever we got was, in some ways, provided

by -- a lot of it was provided by the U.S. government in terms of social media accounts.

There are pleadings and information that we obtained from the clerk's office that are under seal that -- for example, every search warrant that was obtained by the City of Charlottesville police department in this matter -- and when I say "this matter," as it relates to the prosecution of Mr. Fields in the Commonwealth of Virginia, every search warrant was placed under seal.

In order to access those search warrants, I had to have the Court enter an order allowing me to access those documents and providing that I would not release them. Those are all documents that I got from the clerk's office that -- and the Commonwealth's Attorney has copies of the search warrants from the officers that were never placed under seal. They're not under any obligation to keep those, I mean, if they have them -- under the Court's theory, this Court's theory that it's from a different source, they got them from the police department.

The -- I'm trying to look at the different categories of information. The electronic files that are on my computer, that I would need to go through to determine whether it was something that I created, something I received from a third source, third party, or something I received from the Commonwealth, my electronic files are 24.5 gigabytes

of information, much of which will be work-product or privileged.

And I'm assuming that the plaintiffs and the Court, if I'm claiming that something on my computer or in my files that I received from a third source is privileged, work-product, protected by HIPAA, or under seal, that, pursuant to the rules, I'm going to need to create a log indicating what there is.

And I agree with the Court, some of it can be rather broad, but some of it is not going to be -- some of the information on the log is not going to be that broad.

THE COURT: So, Ms. Lunsford, I think there are some things that sounds like there's nothing -- I think there's nothing prohibiting you from turning it over. I mean, the materials from the Commonwealth that are -- that are outside of the protective order -- so exculpatory materials, things like that -- that should all be turned over. Anything that you or Mr. Fields under the criminal discovery rules in Virginia are entitled to receive, I think that's outside of the scope of Judge Downer's order.

Do you agree with that?

MS. LUNSFORD: I agree.

THE COURT: Okay. So I think that needs to be turned over. And there are some things that I think should just be -- you need to just go ahead and you need to get

those to the plaintiffs. And then there's some other categories that maybe are a little more difficult.

The third-party e-mails to you that are unsolicited, where people are just reaching out to you, I have trouble seeing how that would be, you know, work-product because it --

MS. LUNSFORD: I agree. My concern with that is the amount of time that it's going to take me to go through the e-mails to find those, as opposed to the ones from Mr. Hill. And some of them will be easy. Some of them may not be so easy.

THE COURT: Yeah.

MS. LUNSFORD: And I agree. Ones that I received from third parties unsolicited, I have not had the opportunity to go through them. I can tell the Court that I'm concerned about the amount of time that it will take and my ability to pay my mortgage and rent.

THE COURT: Well, and I -- and, Ms. Lunsford, you know, like I said earlier, I think there is a provision in the federal rules to allow for payments to cover, you know, the costs of producing these documents, and so I think that's something that we'll certainly have to consider here.

All right.

THE CLERK: Your Honor, can you wait just a minute?

My recording has stopped.

1 THE COURT: Okay.

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(Pause in proceedings)

THE CLERK: Okay. It's recording, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. SIEGEL: Your Honor, this is Joshua Siegel. If I -- Ms. Lunsford had quit. If I could just have a minute or two to make a few very brief comments.

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. SIEGEL: So, you know, on the issue of burden, we're trying -- we're really trying everything we can think of to help move this along. You know, not once have Ms. Lunsford and Mr. Hill met and conferred before any of their motions. But we have told them -- you know, Mr. Hill sent me a letter yesterday about certain categories, and I responded to him this morning and said, you know, some of these categories, you don't have to even review. He asked me, for example, you know, pleadings that were filed, did he have to produce all the pleadings that were filed. We said no, you don't have to produce those. Other categories we've told him multiple times, like the jury questionnaires, jury information, no, don't produce that. Let's narrow the scope, let's make it easier. You don't have to produce those pleadings; that's not what we're looking for. Don't produce the jury questionnaires.

Things that they mentioned in their brief, like

communications with the court clerk or communications with the federal public defenders, obviously, again, we're not looking for public documents. The e-mails, you know, to the clerk filing things, we don't need that. We don't have to review that kind of stuff. We're trying to narrow this as much as we possibly can.

On the issue of what is easy for them to produce now, there are certain categories that they can literally press a few buttons and get documents to us. They have electronic devices, a hard drive, and three thumb drives. They know none of it is privileged. They know it is all responsive. There's no reason they can't give that to us right now.

They have other documents, like the e-mails. Your Honor, one of the things I do quite a bit in my practice is electronic discovery. I'm happy to work with Ms. Lunsford and make suggestions on ways she can search through her e-mail to make it less burdensome. I'm happy to do that, Your Honor.

But the bottom line is: As you just heard her say,
Your Honor, I think Ms. Lunsford and Mr. Hill have a bit of a
broad understanding of the work-product doctrine, and she is
planning on asserting things like Mr. Fields' school records
are somehow work-product. And so if we're going to be back
here having a fight over that, that's all the more reason we

need these documents now. We've been waiting for -- we're pushing seven months on the subpoena right now. There are things that they can get us quickly and easily, and they should have to give it to us right now, without delay.

And as relates to the documents that they got from the Commonwealth's Attorney, again, we're not obligated to have to try and get them from the Commonwealth's Attorney. I just believe it's easier for them to produce it, because they literally have it segregated already on a hard drive and on three thumb drives, and the Commonwealth's Attorney doesn't have to recreate it. Ms. Lunsford and Mr. Hill can just produce it.

And, again, as relates to that Court order, Your

Honor, frankly, from my perspective, it's too little too late
on this motion. Again, this is a motion to reconsider. This
is not new evidence. That order has been here for two years.

And, frankly, I think the Court is right, it doesn't apply
for a few of the other reasons I mentioned. And if

Ms. Lunsford and Mr. Hill think it does, then, again, I think
they've already got consent from the Commonwealth's

Attorney's Office; they can produce these documents. They
have an order, Your Honor. It would be very easy for them,
if they want to make sure they're not violating the Court's
order, just to submit an agreed order to the judge, allowing
them to produce the documents. Again, they already have

agreement from all the parties. That takes care of that order. There's no reason that they can't be held to the standard in this Court's order to produce those documents.

THE COURT: And, you know, I certainly want to make sure that I'm affording all respect to the Charlottesville General District Court's order and discovery practices, too. So while this order was presented to me at such a late time, I also -- it's something I think I have to consider and make sure that this Court is -- is properly taking into account. You know, what I had said in the previous order on the motions to quash as to the federal court, that really the federal court's criminal discovery order is really a matter that needed to be raised, and in that case, you know, I'm just wondering if it's something that if the Commonwealth isn't -- has essentially waived their -- waived the protections that they sought for discovery, then, of course, the plaintiffs and y'all want this information.

And, Ms. Lunsford, is this something that y'all can present an agreed-upon order to the General District Court just saying that it would be -- you know, that under this Court's order, that --

MS. LUNSFORD: I'd be happy to do that.

THE COURT: -- they can be relieved of that order, with the understanding that anything that's produced, you know, if it's sensitive material, there's a protective order

in this case as well, so it's not that this information is all of a sudden just going to be splashed about?

MS. LUNSFORD: Yeah, I would request that the plaintiff draft that. You know, I -- I don't mean to be disrespectful to the Court. I actually have -- it's just me, so in order to start going through the documents, copying discs and thumb drives, going through e-mails, preparing orders for the Court, I'm the only one that can go through my e-mails. The Commonwealth -- or Mr. Siegel can prepare an order for the Court that can be sent to me electronically, and I'll walk it over to the Court or send it to the Commonwealth and ask that they get it entered.

MR. SIEGEL: Your Honor, I'm happy to draft that and have it to Ms. Lunsford tomorrow.

THE COURT: Certainly, Ms. Lunsford, I think that's an appropriate request. I do think it should be something that could come from the -- you know, from the plaintiffs.

And on that -- again, on the electronic discovery, you know, I would encourage to take up Mr. Siegel's offer about how to -- either how to search or, you know, whether there can be, you know, some -- some sort of a third-party vendor who could harvest the e-mails; but do that. And, again, there's a cost-shifting provision in Rule 45 that if this is something that's going to be substantial, that you can certainly talk to Mr. Siegel about it. It's something that I

would certainly entertain.

MR. SIEGEL: Your Honor, this is Mr. Siegel. Can I make a suggestion?

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. SIEGEL: You know, one way to structure the order here is to require production of documents that fall outside the scope of that District Court order, including things under Rule 3A, the other documents from third parties, things like that, within -- you know, within -- I think they asked for ten days from the date of this hearing. I think we would be okay with that if they really need that much time, Your Honor.

And then insofar as it relates to the documents within the scope, order they submit that agreed order within, you know, a day or two; and then within 24 hours of the Court granting that order, to produce those documents to us.

Because what I don't want to have happen, Judge, is the District Court enters the agreed order, two weeks from now, and then we're back here, Oh, we haven't started reviewing the stuff yet, and we don't know where it is, we've got to find all of it. And it's just going to cause more and more delay.

Again, we have just a few weeks left of deposition time here. We just really can't afford to keep litigating this, especially, again, if we have to litigate issues about

whether a school record is work-product.

MS. LUNSFORD: Well, you know, I -- I will -- in terms of what we can and can't afford to do, Mr. Hill and I cannot afford to shut down our practices for the next two weeks in order to respond to the discovery. I will make every effort to do it quickly, and if the plaintiff wants to talk about some sort of compensation for time, I'm happy to keep time.

With respect to school records, I will tell

Mr. Siegel, and so the Court knows, the vast majority of his
school records are prior to January 1, 2015. That does not
necessarily hold true with respect to his medical records.

But I would assert that his medical records and what are his
school records, Army records, are protected by HIPAA. And I
understand the confidentiality, you know, and the expert
confidential designation that can be applied, but I would
also argue that they're privileged, and I do think they're
work-product. And they were obtained -- they were never used
in this litigation except to allow an expert to review them
for purposes of mitigation in a murder case.

MR. SIEGEL: Again, Your Honor, that was kind of exactly my point, is, you know, none of the documents she described did she create in anticipation of litigation. You know, these are squarely not work-product, but it sounds like we're going to have to have that fight, and that's why we

really need to get this over with the sooner the better.

MS. LUNSFORD: And I would argue, also, that the subpoena is overbroad if -- if it is -- if it is -- when it relates to all documents that were obtained from any third party, which would include medical care providers, with no limitation except the date, that they're not relevant to any matter that's in dispute in the civil proceeding, as far as Mr. Campbell has explained it to me.

MR. SIEGEL: Your Honor, any relevancy or overly broad objections we could have heard on the motion to quash. There's no need --

THE COURT: I agree. I agree with that.

And, Ms. Lunsford, if y'all want to confer further and see if the plaintiffs are willing to -- you know, to not require certain documents to be produced, you know, there may be some that they would agree are not relevant, but I really think that that -- you know, that that argument, really it's way beyond time to raise that.

On the privilege -- and you can -- you can certainly -- with the work-product, I really have trouble seeing how that can be work-product. I understand that you obtained it, but you didn't create these documents and it doesn't have anything with -- with your mental impressions on them. I think, at most, it would be, in fact, work-product. And at this point, I think that I could very easily find that

the plaintiffs don't have any other ability, any other way to obtain that information, and that there is a substantial need for it. So if I had to -- if I had to make that ruling, I think that's how I would come down; that even if it is work-product, it would have to be produced. But I think there probably is some good argument that it's been waived at this point.

Look, I think that -- I think that what has to happen on this motion to reconsider is -- is that there are some categories of documents that I think clearly are not covered by the General District Court's protective order or criminal discovery order, and also the Federal District Court's discovery order and that would need to be produced. I'll put that in an order, but it would be the exculpatory documents, third-party e-mails. And I'll set forth the other ones in a written order, but I think those do need to be produced as soon as possible.

Again, Ms. Lunsford, I think that you have a good argument for shifting the costs to the plaintiffs in this case. You know, I would hope you and Mr. Siegel can talk about that, any reasonable expense that you have to incur in reviewing and producing documents; and then anything that — any costs for copying, you know, I think that those would be compensable.

And if the plaintiffs have a counter or contrary

argument, you can certainly make that, but that's -- that's how I'm viewing this at this time.

As to the Charlottesville General District Court order, I do think that that's -- it's an order that deserves respect from this Court, and I certainly intend to accord it that respect. And there may be some arguments that not everything is covered, but it sounds -- but I also do think that the best approach is for -- if the Commonwealth isn't opposing it -- and it sounds like, Ms. Lunsford and perhaps Mr. Hill, that you aren't opposing being relieved of that order, either -- you know, a joint motion be presented to the General District Court and ask that that order limiting any dissemination from defense counsel's possession or control of the documents be lifted to allow -- but in a limited circumstance, I think, to be produced pursuant to, you know, a lawful Court order, like from this Court, directing that the information be produced.

And anything that should be -- that should be confidential under the protective order that this Court has entered in this case would certainly be protected from further dissemination.

So I really -- I think that's probably how this would have to go.

MS. LUNSFORD: And am I to understand -- because the U.S. Attorney has e-mailed me today wanting to know the

Court's order -- that if a document that was produced, for example, created by an FBI agent was provided to the Commonwealth, and then from the Commonwealth to the defense, that that is something that we need to turn over despite this Court's earlier order in the criminal case?

I'm not arguing; I'm just asking for clarification.

THE COURT: Well, I mean, my order, I think,

recognized the scope of the order that was entered by the Federal District Court in the criminal case in federal court and it talks about, I think, the materials provided by the U.S. Attorney's Office to defense counsel. My view is if it comes from the Commonwealth's Attorney's office, that's not the U.S. Attorney's Office.

MS. LUNSFORD: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Mr. Siegel, Ms. Lunsford, you know, if the U.S. Attorney's Office takes a different view, it's probably a good idea for y'all to have some contact with them and see if there can be an order presented in the Federal District Court as well, again, that would allow any dissemination. That's certainly something that she can look into.

MR. SIEGEL: All right. Thank you.

THE COURT: Mr. Siegel, does that cover everything?

MR. SIEGEL: I think it does, Your Honor. My only question is, as far as deadlines and the dates, so we can

kind of know the ball is moving forward on this, if Your Honor wants to get those now or if those are going to be a forthcoming order.

THE COURT: Well, I think it needs to be in a -just a pretty short written order, but it's going to be up to
the General District Court about how quickly it moves on the
order. I certainly can't require that but I -- Ms. Lunsford,
sounds like you think that you will be able to get that
order -- once you receive it from plaintiffs' counsel, get
that submitted pretty quickly?

MS. LUNSFORD: I'll transmit it to the Commonwealth and see if Mr. Platania will take it up with either the General District Court or the Circuit Court, as he thinks appropriate.

My concern is I also need to focus on the other information. So to the extent to which Mr. Siegel can communicate directly with Mr. Platania, it would be helpful. If he doesn't want to do that, I'll certainly make it happen as soon as I can.

MR. SIEGEL: All right. Your Honor, on behalf of the plaintiffs, I'm happy to do what I can to coordinate with the Commonwealth's Attorney and Ms. Lunsford. I only ask that -- I know we can't know when the District Court is going to move on that, but we ask that you put a deadline actually running from the date that the District Court enters that

agreed order, as far as a deadline, you know, for documents.

THE COURT: Yeah, I will. I will do that.

And, Ms. Lunsford, is it accurate that some of the -- some of the information received, that you received from the Commonwealth, that it's on thumb drives and things like that?

MS. LUNSFORD: It -- it is. It's not all that way.

THE COURT: All right. I would certainly think that things like that, they could be copied very quickly, in either a day or two, and turned over, if the state court agrees to enter the proposed order. So some things like that, I think, can certainly be turned over, they can be turned over very quickly. There may be some other things that would take a little bit longer to go through and assemble, but --

MR. SIEGEL: Your Honor, actually, I'm not sure if
Ms. Lunsford is aware, but we've provided Mr. Hill with an
electronic link where he can actually -- you can actually
just upload documents. You don't need to copy them or
anything. You can just upload them to our secure firewalled
website, and there's a secure encrypted link where you don't
even need to copy it if it's electronic. You just upload
them and they instantly get sent to us. So I'm happy to send
that link to Ms. Lunsford as well.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Well, I will put in

some deadlines and, you know, I'll certainly -- you know, I'll try and be reasonable with those, but I definitely recognize that, you know, time is running out in the civil case. And, you know, a lot of these arguments are things that I think could have been raised and dealt with sooner, so --

MS. LUNSFORD: I don't disagree. Your Honor, and everyone, I apologize to the Court for not doing that. In light of our small practice, our unfamiliarity with civil rules of procedure and what was required, you know, frankly, we were expecting the plaintiffs to request a hearing.

I will point out that I did raise the issue of the plaintiffs' ability to get information from other sources in the motion to quash. I understand it was not addressed. We didn't brief it. And I apologize for that.

THE COURT: All right. Well, yeah, I'll encourage you all to just confer further because I think -- Mr. Hill and Ms. Lunsford, I do think that that's another way to really ease some of the burden that is placed on y'all to make this production. And I will try and just get the order out either today or tomorrow on this. Okay?

And to be clear, I think -- I think that the discovery order from the General District Court, even though it was raised really late, I think because of the importance of showing respect to another Court's order, I think that is

something that I have to consider and it gives reason to reconsider the order.

I think that most of the other reasons raised by

Ms. Lunsford and Mr. Hill don't warrant reconsideration, but

I do think that some sort of cost-shifting is appropriate.

And it seems to me that you all can discuss the scope of the production and confer, and I really think that that's going to be in everyone's interest to do.

Okay?

MR. SIEGEL: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Is there anything else we need to address today?

MR. SIEGEL: Your Honor, this is Mr. Siegel. Just one thing. I don't think it really requires the Court to address it, but I just wanted to make the Court aware.

Obviously because of some of these delays in getting documents, I think the parties might end up having to agree to shuffle some of the deadlines around depositions and things like that, just to make sure certain people get deposed with documents, and not having to do it twice. And to the extent that's necessary, the parties will endeavor to reach an agreement on that. So I just want to make the Court aware that that might be necessary.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. All right. Well, I appreciate y'all working on those, and we definitely want to

keep -- try and keep things on track to get the case tried in
October.

MR. SIEGEL: Agreed.

THE COURT: All right. All right. Thank you all. Take care.

MS. LUNSFORD: Thank you.

MR. SIEGEL: Thank you, Your Honor.

(Proceedings adjourned, 2:38 p.m.)

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, JoRita B. Meyer, RMR/CRR, Official Court Reporter for the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, appointed pursuant to the provisions of Title 28, United States Code, Section 753, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript of the proceedings reported by me using the stenotype reporting method in conjunction with computer-aided transcription, and that same is a true and correct transcript to the best of my ability and understanding.

I further certify that the transcript fees and format comply with those prescribed by the Court and the Judicial Conference of the United States.

/s/ JoRita B. Meyer Date: 6/29/2020